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Abstract 
We analyze the pattern of occupational change over the last two decades in Britain, 
Germany, Spain and Switzerland: which jobs have been expanding – high-paid 
jobs, low-paid jobs or both? Based on individual-level data, we examine what 
hypothesis is most consistent with the observed change: skill-biased technical 
change, routinization, skill supply evolution or wage-setting institutions? Our 
analysis reveals massive occupational upgrading that closely matches educational 
expansion: employment expanded most at the top of the occupational hierarchy, 
among managers and professionals. In parallel, mid-range occupations (clerks and 
production workers) declined relative to those at the bottom (interpersonal service 
workers). This U-shaped pattern of upgrading is consistent with the routinization 
hypothesis: technology seems a better substitute for average-paid clerical and 
manufacturing jobs than for low-end service employment. Yet country differences 
in low-paid service job creation suggest that wage-setting institutions play an 
important role, channelling technological change into more or less polarized 
patterns of upgrading.  
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1. Introduction 
In the late 1990s, a consensus emerged among labour market researchers that affluent 
countries were witnessing an ongoing process of occupational upgrading. The evidence 
for Western Europe and the U.S clearly suggested that high-skilled occupations were 
expanding at the expense of low-skilled ones (e.g. Berman et al., 1998; Gallie et al., 
1998). However, this consensus was recently shattered by three influential studies 
finding increasing polarization of the employment structure in the United States (Wright 
and Dwyer, 2003; Autor et al., 2008) and Great Britain (Goos and Manning, 2007). 
Their authors argued that employment growth in both countries has taken place both in 
high-paid professional and managerial jobs and in low-paid personal service jobs, 
whereas employment in average-paid production and office jobs has been declining.  
Three explanations may account for this puzzling finding of a polarizing 
employment structure in the U.S. and Britain. The first focuses on labour demand and 
advances a more nuanced theory of skill-biased technological change where computers 
complement both high-skilled analytical and low-skilled interpersonal tasks, but 
substitute for mid-skilled manual and clerical tasks (Autor et al., 2003, 2008; Manning, 
2004). A second explanation emphasizes changes in labour supply and highlights – for 
the United States – a slowdown in skill supply growth due to slower educational 
expansion (Goldin and Katz, 2007) and increasing Hispanic immigration (Wright and 
Dwyer, 2003). A third explanation emphasizes the role of institutions. It considers the 
creation of low-paid jobs and the resulting employment polarization a distinctive feature 
of Anglo-Saxon countries’ flexible wage-setting institutions (Scharpf, 2000; OECD, 
2004).  
Our paper wishes to contribute to this debate by examining the pattern of 
occupational change for four Western European countries with different institutions: 
Britain, Germany, Spain and Switzerland. The central question we address is what kind 
of jobs have been expanding (or declining) over the last two decades: high-paid jobs, 
low-paid jobs or both? Is occupational polarization limited to the Anglo-Saxon 
countries or is it pervasive across post-industrial economies? 
So far, findings in the literature do not convey a clear-cut picture. If the quality of 
jobs is measured in terms of skills, results point towards unambiguous occupational 
upgrading for Britain (Felstead et al., 2007) and Switzerland (Sheldon, 2005). For 
Germany, conclusions diverge between occupational upgrading (Tahlin, 2007) and 
polarized upgrading (Spitz-Oener, 2006), where high-skilled jobs expanded strongly 
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and low-skilled jobs moderately relative to mid-skilled jobs. Analyses for Spain show 
that over the last thirty years both professionals and – less so – low-skilled service 
workers have strongly increased their numbers (Bernardi and Garrido, 2008). If the 
quality of jobs is measured by occupations’ average earnings, studies find a trend 
towards polarization that is weak in Germany (Dustmann et al., 2009) but relatively 
strong in Britain (Goos and Manning, 2007). Finally, two recent studies based on the 
European Labour Force Survey diverge in their results: pervasive polarization (Goos et 
al., 2009) as opposed to large country differences with an underlying trend towards 
upgrading (Eurofound, 2008). 
We analyze the pattern of occupational change between 1990 and 2008 using large 
individual-level country surveys. Our comparative approach provides us with insights of 
two kinds. Firstly, by using the same methodological framework and time periods for 
four countries, we produce comparable cross-country results. Secondly, by confronting 
the implications of the different theoretical explanations of occupational change with 
the data, we examine which is most consistent with the observed pattern of employment 
change. Typically, technological change is pervasive and should produce similar 
patterns of occupational upgrading or polarization across Western European countries. 
In contrast, wage-setting institutions and, to a lesser extent, skill supply evolution vary 
between countries and should lead to different patterns of employment change.  
Our paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we discuss three competing 
explanations of occupational change: technological change on the demand-side, skill 
evolution on the supply side and wage-setting institutions as intervening factors. In 
section 3, we present the data and discuss our analytical strategy. In section 4 we show 
patterns of occupational change over the last two decades in the four countries. Section 
5 examines how these results fit into explanations of technical change. Section 6 
controls for supply-side influences by looking at the evolution in educational attainment 
and immigration. Section 7 focuses on institutional factors and examines whether 
countries have created jobs in different occupational categories. Section 8 concludes by 
discussing the implications of our findings.  
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2. Theoretical accounts of occupational change 
Transformations in the occupational structure always result from the interaction of 
demand and supply-side factors in a given institutional context. This interaction makes 
the isolation of a single driving force of occupational change difficult and has two 
implications for our study: Firstly, we are better equipped to provide descriptive 
evidence of occupational change than to explain its causes. Secondly, we may gain 
some explanatory leverage by specifying what empirical evidence is consistent or 
inconsistent with different explanatory accounts. We begin our discussion of 
explanations of occupational change by schematically dividing them into three 
accounts: (i) demand-side, (ii) supply-side and (iii) institutional. 
 
(i) Demand-side accounts of occupational change: technical change 
In the long run, the main driving force behind changes in the tasks humans do in their 
jobs is technology (Manning 2004). In comparison, other demand-side factors such as 
international trade or shifts in product demand may at best play a modest role (OECD, 
2005). Until recently, the dominant explanation of employment trends has been skill-
biased technical change (SBTC), which expects the spread of computer-based 
technology to monotonically increase the demand for high-skilled relative to low-skilled 
workers.  
Skill-biased technical change explanations have been challenged by the 
“routinization” hypothesis (Autor et al., 2003; Manning, 2004). The central argument 
involves a re-specification of the types of jobs that are most likely to be replaced by 
technology. While machines cannot easily substitute for non-routine interactive tasks 
such as restaurant waiting, care giving or cleaning, located at the very bottom of the 
occupational hierarchy, they readily take over the routine production and clerical tasks 
typically done in mid-range jobs. Computerized technology is thus seen as 
complementary to both high-paid analytical and low-paid interactive jobs. Rather than 
leading to overall occupational upgrading, technical change is then expected to hollow 
out of the middle and hence to polarize the employment structure (Goos and Manning, 
2007; Autor et al., 2008). 
Explaining transformations in the occupational structure with technical change is 
sensible. Yet, as the fundamental explanatory force remains largely unobserved (DiPrete 
and McManus 1996: 39), its pervasive effects can only be grasped indirectly, by 
detecting homogeneous trends across countries. Technical accounts diverge in the shape 
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of these trends: SBTC expects clear cut upgrading, routinization polarized job growth 
(above all) at the top and (less so) at the bottom at the expense of the middle. 
 
(ii) Supply-side accounts of occupational change: skill composition 
Unlike demand-side accounts that expect similar patterns of occupational change across 
countries, supply-side explanations anticipate cross-national variations. Variations are 
explained by differences in the evolution and characteristics of labour supply (Nickell 
and Bell, 1996; Freeman and Schettkat, 2001). Firms determine their production 
techniques and the jobs they need based on the availability of input factors in each 
country, especially the supply of skills. While the increase in the demand for skills – 
largely due to technology – is relatively stable over time, growth in the supply of skills 
varies depending on the evolution of educational attainment and immigration (Goldin 
and Katz, 2007). Hence, a slow-down or acceleration in countries' educational 
expansion and immigration should affect their pattern of occupational change. 
Table 1 shows the evolution of skill supply in the four countries under study 
between 1990 and 2008 (employed individuals only). All four countries underwent a 
clear process of educational expansion, whereby the share of workers with tertiary 
schooling strongly increased while the share of workers without upper secondary 
education decreased. This process of educational upgrading was clear cut in Britain, 
Germany and, above all, in Spain; in Switzerland the share of workers with medium 
levels of education declined somewhat faster than that of low-skilled workers. 
 
Table 1: Educational attainment and immigrant share in the labour force, 1990-2008 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
% with less than upper 
secondary education 
% with upper 
secondary education 
% with tertiary 
education 
% of immigrants in 
labour force 
 1990 2008 ∆ 1990 2008 ∆ 1990 2008 ∆ 1990 2008 ∆ 
Britain¹ 29 20 -8.8 49 44 -4.3 23 36 13 3.4 8.3 4.9 
Germany² 15 8 -6.8 68 67 -1.9 17 25 8.7 6.6 6.1 -0.5 
Spain 50 17 -33 38 59 21 12 24 12 0.3 16 15 
Switzerland¹ 19 13 -5.7 60 50 -9.4 21 36 15 21 24 2.6 
Sources: own computations based on the British Labour Force Survey, German Socio-Economic Panel, 
Spanish Labour Force Survey, Swiss Labour Force Survey  
¹ 1991 and 2008; ² 1990 and 2007 
Note: our computation of the workforce only includes individuals aged 18-65 years who work at least 20 
hours per week. 
 
In theory, the evolution of countries’ educational attainment integrates the 
contribution of immigration to skill supplies, since their qualifications are also counted. 
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In practice, however, immigration may have an effect onto labour supply that is not 
accurately captured by formal skills levels. The reason is that immigrants often 
downgrade to jobs requiring skill levels below their actual education (Dustmann et al., 
2008). Hence, column (4) of table 1 presents the share and evolution of immigrant 
workers between 1990 and 2008. While the proportion of immigrants in the labour force 
has remained constant in Germany, it augmented slightly in Switzerland, considerably 
in Britain and massively in Spain.  
Based on these changes in the workforce’s skill composition, we expect marked 
occupational upgrading in all four countries, and a strong expansion of high-skilled 
workers relative to medium- and low-skilled workers. In Britain, the sizeable increase in 
immigration has possibly compensated, to some extent, the decline of low-skilled labour 
supply. Hence, a slightly polarized version of occupational upgrading – with strong 
growth at the top and slower decline at the bottom than the middle of the employment 
structure – seems consistent with a supply-based explanation.  
 
(iii) Institutional accounts: wage-setting institutions 
A third and last explanation stresses that in labour markets, demand- and supply-side 
factors are channelled through institutional mechanisms (DiPrete and McManus, 1996; 
Levy and Temin, 2007). In this view, polarization in employment only occurs if low-
paid service jobs are created in substantial numbers. However, creation of such jobs in 
restaurants and supermarkets, nursing homes and private households depends on 
relative wages: where wage-setting institutions compress the wage structure and 
decrease wage flexibility, interpersonal service jobs become too expensive and may 
simply not be created (Krugman, 1994; Scharpf, 2000). In parallel, relatively high 
minimum wages – by making the creation of low-skilled jobs less profitable – may also 
induce firms to invest in workers' productivity and create more medium- and high-
skilled jobs (Acemoglu, 2001). Hence, a common shift in labour demand due, for 
instance, to technical change, may have very different effects on the occupational 
structure depending on countries’ wage-setting institutions.  
In table 2, we compare wage-setting institutions in the four countries by looking at 
measures of collective bargaining, unemployment insurance benefits and wage 
inequality. In terms of bargaining coverage, Germany and Spain have a somewhat more 
protected (and hence probably less flexible) wage structure than Switzerland and 
Britain, thus possibly hampering the creation of low-paid jobs. With respect to 
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unemployment insurance (and hence the reservation wage), Britain provides by far the 
lowest benefit level, while Switzerland’s insurance is slightly more generous than that 
of Germany and Spain. Hence, economic incentives for low-skilled workers to accept 
low-paid jobs are stronger in Britain than in the other countries. Finally, regarding the 
most consequential indicator – the outcome variable of wage-setting institutions, wage 
inequality –, we find that Switzerland and Germany had a more compressed wage 
structure at the beginning of the period under study than Britain and Spain. This result 
holds for both overall and lower-tail wage inequality.  
Based on these indicators, the probability of low-skilled services being priced out 
by high relative wages seems greater in Germany than in Britain, while Spain and 
Switzerland occupy an intermediate position. Hence, occupational polarization due to 
low-wage service job creation seems most likely in Britain and least so in Germany.  
 
Table 2: Bargaining coverage and wage inequality in 1990 and 2000 
 
Collective bargaining:  
% of employees 
covered 
Unemployment 
benefits: average 
replacement rate  
Overall wage 
inequality: decile 9/ 
decile 1 
Lower-tail wage 
inequality: decile 5/ 
decile 1  
 early 1990s early 2000s 1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000 
Britain 47 35 0.28 0.37 3.44 3.47 1.87 1.83 
Germany 70 60 0.66 0.66 2.76 2.93 1.61 1.59 
Spain 70 80 0.694 0.665 3.371 3.50² 1.76² 1.89² 
Switzerland 50 50 0.77 0.77 2.413 2.56 1.511 1.49 
Sources: collective bargaining: Visser (2007); benefit replacement rate, wage inequality (except Spain): OECD; 
wage inequality Spain: own computations based on three surveys carried out by Spain’s Centre for Sociological 
research in 1989 and 1990 (averaged to provide a single measure for 1990) and 2006.  
¹ 1989/90; ² 2006; ³ 2002; 4 1994; 5 2001. 
 
By comparing these different explanations we can single out their two most 
controversial predictions. Undisputed is the expectation that the strongest employment 
growth will take place in the high-skilled occupations. In contrast, expectations diverge 
with respect to (a) the evolution of low-skilled relative to mid-skilled jobs and (b) the 
evolution of low-paid service jobs relative to total employment. While SBTC expects for 
all countries a negative change in these two dimensions (less growth in low-skilled than 
in mid-skilled jobs, slower growth in low-paid services than in total employment), the 
routinization hypothesis expects the opposite. The skill supply hypothesis expects faster 
growth of mid-skilled relative to low-skilled occupations in Germany and Spain, but not 
necessarily in Britain and Switzerland. Finally, the institutional hypothesis predicts 
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stronger than average growth for low-paid services in Britain and possibly Spain, but 
not in Germany and possibly Switzerland.  
 
3. Data and strategy of analysis 
Our analysis of occupational change over the last two decades in Britain, Germany, 
Spain and Switzerland is based on individual-level data stemming from the British 
Labour Force Survey (LFS), the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), the Spanish 
Active Population Survey (EPA) and the Swiss Labour Force Survey (SAKE). For each 
country, we select the 1990 (1991 for LFS and SAKE) and the 2008 (2007 for SOEP) 
waves. While SOEP and SAKE are annual surveys, EPA and – beginning in 1993 – 
LFS are carried out on a quarterly basis. For these two surveys, we have chosen the 
spring quarter. Table A.1 in the annexe shows for each survey the number of working 
individuals and of those reporting earnings. 
Our enquiry builds on the analytical strategy developed by Erik Wright and Rachel 
Dwyer (2003) for the study of occupational change in the United States, subsequently 
applied also to British (Goos and Manning, 2007) and European data (Eurofound 2008). 
Our procedure involves three steps.  
Distinguishing occupations: We first restrict our samples to 18 to 65 years old 
individuals who spend at least 20 hours per week in paid employment. We thus exclude 
workers who, like teenagers, senior workers or employees in small part-time jobs, have 
a marginal attachment to the labour force. In contrast, we include all non-marginal jobs, 
regardless of whether they are filled by wage-earners, self-employed workers or 
employers. We next distinguish occupations using the 4-digit International Standard 
Classification of Occupations (ISCO-88) for Germany and Switzerland, the 3-digit 
Standard Occupational Classification (SOC-90 and SOC-2000) for Britain, and the 3-
digit 1994 National Classification of Occupations (CNO-94) for Spain.1 Occupations 
containing fewer than 10 individuals reporting wages are merged with other occupations 
to increase the accuracy of our estimates.2 Depending on the country, this leaves us with 
171 (Britain), 145 (Germany), 120 (Spain) or 161 (Switzerland) different occupations. 
Unlike Wright and Dwyer (2003), we explicitly integrate the industry-part of an 
occupation only for a few large occupations,3 and this for two reasons: First, our 
national classifications code occupations at a level comparable to the ISCO 4-digit 
level, which already accounts for many industry differences, typically so among 
managers of large and small firms (ISCO-codes 1220-9 and 1310-9, respectively). 
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Second, our German and Swiss samples are too small to allow breaking down 
occupations by industry-sector and obtaining more than 150-200 sizeable subgroups. In 
any case, previous analyses for Britain suggest that results are very similar regardless of 
whether a job is defined by occupation alone or a combination of occupation and 
industry (Goos and Manning 2007: 121). 
Determining job quality: In a second step, we determine whether a given job is 
good or bad, advantageous or undesirable. A large array of job attributes matter to 
people and hence affect a job's quality: earnings, skill requirements, promotion 
prospects, job security or work autonomy. While these indicators capture different 
dimensions of a job, they are closely correlated. Hence, following Wright and Dwyer 
(2003: 294), we use earnings as the arguably most consequential and most reliably 
measurable indicator of an occupation's quality. In what follows we thus equate 
occupational upgrading with an expansion of occupations with comparatively high 
median earnings at the expense of occupations with low median earnings. Note that we 
only resort to earnings in order to rank-order occupations: The focus of our analysis lies 
on the quantity side– employment –, and not the price side – wages – of the labour 
market. We calculate an occupation’s earning as the average of its standardized hourly 
median earning at the beginning and end of the period under study, weighted by the 
number of individuals employed in the occupation at a given moment.4 
Rank-ordering occupations into quintiles: Once we have calculated the median 
earning of each occupation, we rank-order the 120 to 171 occupations from the lowest-
paid to the highest-paid, grouping them into five equally large quintiles containing as 
close as possible to 20% of total employment at the beginning of the period under 
study.5 The bottom quintile thus holds the 20% of employment in the occupations with 
the lowest median earnings. In Germany, this quintile 1 includes waiters, personal care 
workers, sales clerks, hairdressers, sewers and cleaners. Likewise, the highest quintile 5 
comprises the 20% of employment in the occupations with the highest median earnings. 
In Germany, these occupations comprise medical doctors, civil engineers, legal and 
computer professionals and marketing managers. We determine the pattern of 
occupational change on the basis of how occupations in these five quintiles evolve in 
terms of employment from 1990 to 2008. 
We need to address two potential concerns about our analytical approach. First, our 
allocation of occupations into quintiles assumes that occupations' rankings by median 
earnings change little over time. We test this assumption by calculating Spearman's 
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correlation between occupations' rankings at the beginning and end of the period in each 
country. These correlations are very strong, ranging between 0.70 (Spain), 0.87 
(Switzerland) and 0.90 (both Britain and Germany). Hence, like prior studies (Goos and 
Manning 2007: 122), we find considerable stability in the occupational earnings 
structure.  
A second concern relates to the comparability of occupational changes across 
countries. In effect, some occupations may rank higher in terms of earnings in one 
country than in another. Yet this does not affect our ability to investigate whether good 
or bad, high-earning or low-earning jobs are expanding within each country. We are 
comparing the evolution of 'good' and 'bad' jobs in each country – and not tracing the 
evolution of the same occupations across countries. Regardless, the occupational 
hierarchy looks surprisingly similar in our four countries. Everywhere, sales clerks, 
waiters and agricultural labourers are found in the bottom quintile 1; senior officials, 
computer professionals and medical doctors in the top quintile 5; bricklayers and truck 
drivers in quintile 2, and nurses and police officers in quintile 4.  
 
4. Findings for the pattern of occupational change, 1990-2008 
Before examining changes in quintiles' sizes, we present in tables 3 and 4 the three 
occupations that have experienced the largest expansion or decline over the last two 
decades in each country. To convey a sense of quintiles' occupational composition, the 
last columns of tables 3 and 4 report the job quality quintile in which each occupation 
falls. 
Strongly growing occupations can be divided into two groups: the first comprises 
highly qualified occupations such as financial managers, legal and computer 
professionals set in (private) business services; the second includes (public) social 
service jobs such as health care employees, teachers and social workers. In all four 
countries, the expansion of computer professionals and (assistant) nursing staff has been 
particularly strong. 
We can distinguish three groups of strongly declining occupations. A first group 
comprises the victims of de-industrialization and includes craft and production workers 
such as mechanics, maintenance fitters and assemblers. These manufacturing jobs are 
not particularly low-paid, for they spread across the middle quintiles 2 to 4. The same 
observation applies to a second group of shrinking occupations – office clerks and 
secretaries – which represent typical mid-range jobs set in the middle quintile 3. Finally, 
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the fall in employment has also been strong in a third group of agricultural workers and 
farmers. Yet unlike jobs in production or the secretariat, these jobs are unequivocally 
associated with low earnings and thus set in quintile 1.  
 
Table 3: The three occupations with the largest increase of their share in total employment 
Country Occupation Change in employment 
share in percentage points 
Job quality 
quintile* 
GB, 1991- Care assistants & attendants 1.26 1 
2008 Treasurers & financial managers 1.12 5 
 Educational assistants 1.09 1 
DE, 1990- Legal professional, not else specified 2.57 5 
2007 Nursing associate professionals 1.01 3 
 Social workers 1.01 3 
ES, 1990- Cashiers, tellers, etc. with direct client-contact 1.80 3 
2008 Office and hotel cleaners 1.68 1 
 Health care attendants in hospitals and rest homes 1.67 4 
CH, 1991- Managers in private services except banking 1.92 5 
2008 Computer systems designers & analysts 1.25 5 
 Secondary education teachers 1.04 5 
* Job quality quintile 1 regroups the 20% of employment set in the occupations with the lowest median 
earnings, job quality quintile 5 the 20% of employment set in the occupations with the highest median earnings.  
 
Table 4: The three occupations with the largest decline of their share in total employment 
Country Occupation Change in employment 
share in percentage points 
Job quality 
quintile 
GB, 1991- Other secretarial personnel, not else specified -1.67 3 
2008 Metal work maintenance fitters -1.43 4 
 Service industry managers -1.34 3 
DE, 1990- Agricultural workers -1.25 1 
2007 Industrial machine mechanics & fitters -1.24 4 
 Car, taxi, van drivers -1.20 1 
ES, 1990- Unskilled construction workers -4.27 2 
2008 Self-employed farmers -2.79 1 
 Skilled agricultural workers -2.25 1 
CH, 1991- Office clerks in private services except banking -2.19 3 
2008 Sales and services elementary occupations -2.00 1 
 Manufacturing labourers -2.00 1 
 
These findings suggest that the shift away from agricultural, industrial and clerical 
jobs towards business and welfare services upgraded the occupational system. We check 
this possibility by computing in figure 1 relative changes in quintiles’ sizes in each 
country. Hence, for Britain, the increase of 0.6 percentage points in quintile 1 means 
that the least-paid occupations’ share of total employment grew from 20 to 20.6% per 
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cent between 1991 and 2008. Likewise, the decrease of 4.8 percentage points in quintile 
3 means that the employment share of mid-range occupations fell from 20 to 15.2 per 
cent. Four remarks can be made regarding these results. 
First, job expansion is clearly biased towards high-paid occupations in all four 
countries. In Germany, net job expansion has been entirely concentrated in the best paid 
occupations of quintile 5. Similarly, in Britain, Spain and Switzerland, more than 75 per 
cent of net employment growth took place in occupations of the top quintile. 
Second, in Britain and Switzerland employment declined most in the middle 
quintile 3, whereas in Germany and Spain it did so in the lowest-paid occupations of 
quintile 1.  
Third, we can clearly discard the hypothesis of occupational downgrading for all 
four countries. We obtain a clear-cut picture of occupational upgrading in Germany and 
– with the exception of the stronger decline in quintiles 3 and 4 respectively – also in 
Switzerland and Spain. Results are more contrasted for Britain, suggesting a pattern of 
‘polarized upgrading’ with strong employment growth at the top of the occupational 
hierarchy, substantial losses in the middle, and very slight growth at the bottom.  
Fourth, unlike Goos, Manning and Salomons (2009), but consistent with Eurofound 
(2008), our analysis reveals important country differences: while the best-paid 
occupations expanded in all four countries, we do not find the patent cross-national 
similarities predicted by hypotheses based on pervasive technological change.    
 
Figure 1:  relative net employment change in job quality quintiles (in percentage points) 
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By looking at relative changes in employment, we might overlook country 
differences in absolute job growth or decline. Although countries' business cycles 
evolved in parallel – a sharp recession in 1991-93, a slow recovery in 1994-97, 
sustained booms in 1998-2001 and 2004-2007 with a short dip in 2002-03 –, the extent 
of job creation varied widely. Hence, while Spain embarked after 1994 on a decade of 
massive job expansion at an annual rate of 4 per cent, employment increased at a much 
slower pace in Britain and Switzerland (1% annually) and almost stagnated in Germany 
(0.6% annually). In order to account for these differences, we show in table 5 
occupational change in absolute terms. While the pattern of change is identical to that 
revealed in figure 1, levels change. Interestingly, the three large countries in our sample 
created about the same amount of jobs in the high-paid top quintile over the last two 
decades: 2.5 millions in Germany, 2.8 in Britain and 3.1 in Spain. Of course, given 
Spain’s smaller workforce, this implies a much larger relative increase (+27%) than in 
Britain (+12%) and Germany (+7%). With the exception of the Spanish ‘job miracle’, 
all countries lost jobs in the middle quintiles 2 and 3. The main difference between 
countries lies in the employment trajectory of the lowest-paid occupations. While 
Britain and Spain created 720’000 (+3.1%) and 440’000 jobs (+3.8%) in quintile 1, 
Germany lost 840’000 (-2.5%) and Switzerland 50’000 jobs (-1.8%). Differences in 
country’s job record since 1990 thus seem closely linked to changes at the low-paid end 
of the labour market (Scharpf 2000; Kenworthy 2003). 
 
Table 5: Absolute net employment change in quintiles – in thousand jobs (and %) 
 Quintile 1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Quintile 5 Total 
GB 1991-08 717  (3.1) -645 (-2.8) -704 (-3.0) 612  (2.6) 2815  (12) 2795  (12) 
DE 1990-07 -840 (-2.5) -545 (-1.6) -604 (-1.8) -283 (-0.8) 2483 (7.3) 211 (0.6) 
ES 1990-08  443  (3.8) 470  (4.0) 1855   (16) 766  (6.6) 3128  (27) 6663  (57) 
CH 1991-08 -53 (-1.8) -3 (-0.1) -150 (-5.0) 115  (3.8) 409  (14) 318  (11) 
Note: our computation of the workforce only includes individuals aged 18-65 years who work at least 20 
hours per week. If small part-time jobs are also included, employment growth is larger.  
 
A second issue not addressed by figure 1 concerns timing - the possibility that the 
gradual shift in employment from upgrading to polarization generated by technological 
change may have occurred at different times and speeds in each country. An analysis 
based on only two time points may blur this transition. Accordingly, figure 2 
decomposes occupational change over three six-year subperiods. Moreover, in order to 
account for differences in business cycle across subperiods, we compute occupational 
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change in absolute terms. Our results suggest that a shift from clear cut occupational 
upgrading to more polarized change took place in all four countries. The first 1990-96 
subperiod coincides everywhere with strong employment gains at the top and losses in 
the middle and bottom of the occupational hierarchy. Trends towards occupational 
upgrading thus seem particularly strong in recessionary periods, as the burden of 
economic restructuring, downsizing and unemployment is disproportionately 
shouldered by low-paid workers. Upgrading may thus come at a cost for a sizeable 
proportion of the labour force. 
While the upgrading pattern holds for the two subsequent subperiods of 1996-02 
and 2002-08 – the top quintile expanding strongly –, there is also job growth in the 
lowest-paid occupations of quintile 1 in all four countries. In Britain, Germany and 
Switzerland, this expansion at the bottom coincides with declining employment in the 
middle quintile 3. Hence, after 1996, we observe for these three countries a substantial 
fall in mid-range jobs, which contrasts with strong job growth at the top and modest job 
growth at the bottom. Spain is an exception as employment expanded substantially after 
1996 in all five quintiles. Still, Spanish job creation in the last subperiod 2002-08 
somewhat resembles Britain’s pattern of polarized upgrading, with the strongest growth 
taking place at the top and bottom of the employment structure. 
 
Figure 2: absolute net employment change in quintiles over subperiods (in thousand jobs) 
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5. The impact of labour demand: technical change 
The gradual shift from occupational upgrading to polarization, shown in figure 2, seems 
consistent with the argument that skill-biased technical change was dominant in the 
1980s, but has given way to routinization in the 1990s (Autor et al. 2008). In this 
section we contrast the ability of the two technical accounts to explain overall 
employment change by analyzing whether this change best matches the evolution of 
occupations’ (a) skills levels, or (b) dominant tasks. SBTC predicts a positive and 
monotonous link between skill levels and employment growth. Technological change 
should lead to stronger growth in high- than mid-skilled, and in mid- than low-skilled 
occupations. In contrast, routinization expects employment to primarily expand in 
occupations dominated by non-routine tasks. These occupations may either consist of 
high-paid non-routine analytical and interactive tasks, or of low-paid non-routine 
service and manual tasks.  
We divide occupations into three skill levels: low-skilled occupations where more 
than 30 per cent of workers have no upper secondary education; high-skilled 
occupations where more than 30 per cent have tertiary education, and the residual 
category of mid-skilled occupations. Similarly, we draw on Spitz-Oener’s work (2006: 
243) to classify occupations according to their dominant tasks into three groups 
performing: non-routine service and manual tasks (caring, serving; renovating, driving), 
routine cognitive and manual tasks (typewriting, calculating; operating and controlling 
machines), and non-routine analytical and interactive tasks (researching, planning; 
coordinating, teaching).6 Occupations are allocated into a skill and task category 
according to their values at the beginning of the period analyzed.  
Has employment in these skill and task groups grown or declined over the last two 
decades? The upper half of table 6 shows for all four countries very strong growth in 
high-skilled jobs, i.e. in occupations which in 1990/91 contained more than 30 per cent 
of workers with tertiary education. With the exception of Spain where also mid-skilled 
occupations expanded, net employment growth was limited to high-skilled jobs. More 
ambiguous is the evolution of mid- and low-skilled occupations. While low-skilled jobs 
decreased everywhere more than mid-skilled jobs, both skill categories declined (except 
mid-skilled workers in Spain) – and to a similar extent in Britain. Moreover, since mid-
skilled occupations constitute the largest skill category in Britain, Germany and 
Switzerland, job losses in their ranks exceeded those of low-skilled occupations in 
absolute numbers. 
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The lower half of table 6 presents the evolution of employment in occupations 
grouped according to their dominant task. We observe in all four countries a stark 
contrast between the strong expansion in non-routine analytical and interactive jobs 
(professionals, managers, etc.) and the marked decline in routine cognitive and manual 
jobs (clerks, production workers, etc.). The evolution of non-routine service and manual 
occupations – in all four countries the task group with the lowest median earnings – is 
between the two extremes: slightly declining in Germany and Switzerland, slightly 
increasing in Britain and, above all, Spain. The stronger decline in occupations 
dominated by routine cognitive or manual tasks than in occupations consisting of non-
routine service and manual tasks is consistent with the routinization hypothesis. At the 
same time, expansion in top-end and low-end non-routine occupations took place only 
in Britain and Spain: contrary to the polarization argument, Germany and Switzerland 
witnessed a decrease in low-end non-routine occupations' employment share.  
 
Table 6: employment change 1990-2008 in occupations according to their skill level or 
dominants task in 1990 
 GB, 91-08 DE, 90-07 ES, 90-08 CH, 90-07 
Change by skills:     
Low-skilled occupations -16% -23% -8% -26% 
Mid-skilled occupations -15% -11% 41% -14% 
High-skilled occupations 41% 53% 44% 63% 
Change by tasks     
Non-routine service & 
manual occupations 12% -7% 31% -2% 
Routine cognitive & 
manual occupations -33% -29% -41% -32% 
Non-routine analytical & 
interactive occupations 27% 36% 41% 41% 
Note: employment change is 1991-2008 for GB and CH, 1990-2007 for DE. 
 
These computations suggest that the evolution in Britain (and possibly Spain) may 
be better resumed by routinization, whereas occupational change in Germany (and 
possibly Switzerland) seems more consistent with SBTC. However, our skill and task 
groups are not mutually exclusive: an important part of low-skilled occupations are 
dominated by routine cognitive and manual tasks; likewise, a sizeable proportion of 
non-routine service and manual occupations are mid-skilled. Accordingly, we combine 
the three skill- with the three task-groups and thus create 9 skill-task categories. For one 
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of these categories – low-skilled non-routine service and manual occupations – SBTC 
and routinization formulate opposed expectations: SBTC predicts decline, routinization 
expects expansion. These occupations, which accounted for between 5 (Germany) and 
15 (Britain) per cent of all jobs in 1990, increased their share of employment by 9 per 
cent in Britain and 31 per cent in Spain, but decreased it by 2 per cent in Germany and 
29 per cent in Switzerland. Hence, routinization correctly predicts the massive loss in 
mid-skilled routine cognitive and manual occupations' employment share: -31% in 
Britain, -30% Germany, -38% in Spain and -35% Switzerland. Yet its expectation of an 
expanding lower-end service employment is not met in Germany and Switzerland.  
In a next step, we examine the impact of demand factors on employment change by 
looking at the evolution of earnings. If job growth at the bottom of the occupational 
structure is caused by a shift in labour demand, we should see a parallel rise in earnings. 
Hence, if occupational change is demand-induced, changes in earnings (prices) and 
employment (quantity) should co-vary positively (Autor et al., 2008: 319). We examine 
this argument by computing real change in quintiles' median earnings over the period 
for each country.  
The results, shown in figure 3, point to a strong covariance between changes in 
employment (comparing with figure 1 above) and in earnings in Switzerland and, above 
all, in Britain. In both countries, employment and earnings expanded most strongly in 
the top quintile 5 and least so in the mid-range occupations of quintile 3. In Britain (but 
not in Switzerland), wages also increased markedly in the bottom quintile, producing 
the U-shaped pattern of wage evolution that parallels the one predicted by routinization 
for employment. Pearson’s correlation coefficients tentatively suggest that changes in 
wages and employment covary positively in Switzerland (0.73) and, above all, Britain 
(0.85). Albeit weaker, a positive correlation is also evident for Germany (0.57) where 
growth in employment and wages was strongest at the top, and weakest at the bottom of 
the occupational hierarchy. For these three countries, shifts in labour demand thus seem 
to play a central role in explaining the observed pattern of occupational change. In 
Spain, earnings also rose – like in Britain – more at the fringes than in the mid-range 
quintiles, but unlike in Britain evolution in earnings did not match change in 
employment in the two bottom quintiles, which declined. Accordingly, the correlation 
between wage and employment change is weak and negative in Spain (-0.23). 
Two caveats must be expressed. Our samples for Britain, Spain and Switzerland are 
the best available datasets to investigate change in employment, but this is not true for 
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earnings; especially in Spain, the samples are small (see endnote 4), and thus reduce the 
precision of our estimates. Moreover, other factors besides demand-induced shifts may 
affect the evolution of earnings, notably institutional changes such as the introduction 
(1999) and subsequent increase of the minimum wage in Britain. 
 
Figure 3: real change in quintiles median wage between early 1990s and end of 2000s 
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Note: as wage data are only available in British LFS starting from 1993, wage change in Britain refers to 
1993-2008. For Spain, wage change refers to the period 1989/90-2006. 
Nominal wage evolution has been adjusted for inflation with the GDP deflator series contained in the 
OECD economic outlooks. 
 
Our analyses of demand-side factors suggest that Britain’s employment polarization 
is most consistent with the routinization argument. Shifts in demand have favoured low-
paid workers performing non-routine service and manual tasks and, above all, high-paid 
workers doing analytical and interactive tasks, increasing their share of employment and 
wages. In contrast, they were biased against mid-paid workers doing routine cognitive 
and manual tasks. At the other extreme, we observe in Germany a demand shift of the 
kind predicted by SBTC: a monotonic change in employment and earnings favouring 
high-skilled and high-paid occupations. More ambiguous is our evidence for Spain and 
Switzerland. Spain experienced the pattern of task polarization and wage gains at the 
fringes expected by routinization, yet without the marked job expansion in the bottom 
quintile. In Switzerland, skill upgrading of the type predicted by SBTC coexisted with 
marked losses in real wages in the middle.    
 
6. The impact of labour supply: educational expansion and immigration  
We examine whether shifts in the workforce’s skill composition contribute to the 
explanation of occupational change by resorting to an exercise in counterfactuals: What 
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would the pattern of occupational change have looked like if quintiles’ relative 
employment had evolved in perfect symmetry with changes in skill supply?  
We use decomposition analysis to answer this question: first, we define skills as a 
combination of educational attainment (distinguishing six levels)7 and experience 
(distinguishing four age groups)8. These distinctions are used to decompose the 
workforce into 24 education-age groups and determine each group’s contribution to 
each quintile of employment in 1990. We then simulate the type of occupational 
structure that would have unfolded if the distribution of education-age groups within 
each quintile had remained stable between 1990 and 2008 and the sole source of 
variation were changes in the size of the 24 education-age groups. If predicted and 
observed change in skills differ strongly, we must assume that occupational change 
occurred independently from the evolution in skill supply. 
Between 1990 and 2008, the workforce in all four countries became, overall, better 
educated and older. Accordingly, our decomposition analysis shown in figure 4 predicts 
clear-cut and massive occupational upgrading. In all countries, the pattern of 
occupational change predicted on the basis of skill supply evolution mirrors closely the 
observed one. The correspondence between changing skill supplies and changes in 
employment is strongest in Germany and Switzerland, where vocational training 
dominates, and weakest in Spain, where educational expansion over the last two 
decades was particularly strong and outpaced occupational upgrading. Nonetheless, 
figure 4 suggests that educational advance and occupational upgrading have gone hand 
in hand in all four countries. The strong increase in skill supply – notably the expansion 
of tertiary education – is clearly an important explanatory piece of the occupational 
puzzle. There are, however, two important exceptions where we would expect a 
different pattern of occupational change based on skill supply evolution.  
First, the observed employment loss in quintile 3 is much larger than what our 
decomposition analysis predicts for Britain, Germany and Switzerland: relative 
employment fell by 1.7 (Britain), 2.1 (Germany) and even 3.2 (Switzerland) percentage 
points more than predicted by skill groups’ evolution (Spain is an exception insofar as 
the employment share of quintile 3 expanded until 1996). Second, we observe 
everywhere a smaller decline in the employment share of the lowest-paid quintile 1 than 
expected by the evolution of skill groups. This is particularly true for Britain, where 
skill groups’ changing size should have led to a fall of 5.9 percentage points in quintile 
1. Instead, we observe an increase of 0.6 points in relative employment. 
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Figure 4: predicted and observed change in relative employment in quintiles (predicted on the 
basis of skill supply evolution) 
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Note: changes in quintiles’ relative employment are predicted based on actual changes in the size of 24 
education-age groups between 1990 and 2008 (all the while assuming an unchanged distribution of 
education-age groups within each quintile).  
 
 
Hence, while skill supply and occupational structure have evolved in a surprisingly 
similar manner, both substantial loss of mid-range jobs and relative stability of low-paid 
jobs run contrary to predictions based on skill supplies. Above all Britain and Spain’s 
skill evolution would lead us to expect a much larger decline in low-paid occupations – 
unless the recent rise in immigration had an impact on low-paid labour supply that is not 
adequately captured by formal educational attainment figures. This is likely to be the 
case, as new immigrants are often unable to put their human capital into immediate use 
because of language barriers, information deficiencies and discrimination. As Dustmann 
and colleagues (2008) show for Britain, immigrants tend to downgrade upon arrival and 
compete with native workers at lower occupational levels than expected by their 
educational attainment. Hence, strong surges in immigration as those experienced in 
Britain and Spain since the end of the 1990s may have created the labour supply 
necessary to fill the low-paid jobs of quintile 1. We test this argument by disaggregating 
relative change in employment for four different nationality-gender groups: national 
men, national women, foreign men and foreign women (see table A.2 in the annexe). 
The goal is to determine each group's net contribution to the observed pattern of 
occupational change. Three findings are noteworthy. 
Firstly, in both Britain and Spain, expansion in the low-paid jobs of quintile 1 is 
exclusively due to job growth among foreign workers. In Britain, the increasing 
employment share of quintile 1 by 0.6 percentage point is the result of falling 
employment among national men and women (-1.1 percentage points), 
overcompensated by an increase in employment among foreign men and women (+1.8 
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percentage points). In Spain too, foreign workers have strongly expanded in the two 
bottom quintiles (by 4.1 percentage points in Q1 and 3.9 in Q2). Without Spain’s large 
immigration boom, we would have observed a much stronger trend towards 
occupational upgrading. In fact, Spanish men’s employment share in the two bottom 
quintiles fell dramatically since 1990 (combined by 12.6 percentage points). Spanish 
women’s employment share in the same two quintiles declined as well, but less 
markedly (-5 percentage points). Unlike in Britain and Spain, shifts in employment 
were very similar for nationals and foreigners in Switzerland, whereas immigrants’ 
impact on occupational change in Germany was negligible.  
Secondly, occupational upgrading in all countries was strongly driven by national 
women. While their share in the lowest-paid jobs of quintile 1 declined strongly, it 
increased massively in the highest-paid jobs of quintile 5. To give the example of 
Germany: between 1990 and 2007 the employment share of quintile 5 increased from 
20 to 27.2 per cent of total employment. To this job growth of 7.2 percentage points, 
German women contributed 4.2 percentage points, compared to men’s 2.7 point 
contribution (and foreign men’s 0.2 points). Similar results are found for British, 
Spanish and Swiss women. Hence, women’s catch-up process in educational attainment 
seems to have translated into higher occupational achievement in all four countries.  
Thirdly, the fall in the mid-range quintiles was strongly determined by national 
men’s declining employment in average-paid jobs. Between 1990 and 2008, national 
men's employment share in quintiles 2 to 4 shrank by 16 percentage points in Spain, 9.3 
in Britain, 7.2 in Switzerland and 5.1 in Germany. In all four countries, national men 
increased their employment share only in the highest-paid occupations of quintile 5. In 
Switzerland, the slight tendency towards polarization – driven by the fall in the middle 
quintile 3 – was exclusively due to national men’s job trajectory. In contrast, in Britain, 
all four nationality-gender groups underwent a polarizing pattern of change where job 
growth was stronger at the bottom and the top than in the middle. Although immigration 
contributed to the polarization of Britain’s employment structure, it was not the decisive 
factor.  
 
7. The impact of institutions: differences in service job creation 
The analyses shown so far leave a central question unanswered: why has the 
employment share of low-paid jobs in the bottom quintile expanded in some countries 
and periods, but not in others (see figures 1 and 2)? A possible explanation focuses on 
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how country’s wage-setting institutions affect job creation in quintile 1: job creation 
should be the easier, the lower the median wage in quintile 1 relative to the entire 
workforce's median wage. Table 7 suggests that this relationship holds for our four 
countries: in Britain and Spain, where the bottom quintile's median wage in 1990 was 
low relative to the entire workforce's median wage, employment in quintile 1 expanded 
much more markedly than in Switzerland and, above all, Germany, where relative 
wages in quintile 1 were significantly higher.   
 
Table 7: Relative wages and employment creation in the bottom-end quintile 1 
 Median wage of quintile 1 as % 
of entire workforce's median 
wage in 1990/91 
Absolute employment growth in 
occupations of quintile 1, 1990-
2008 
GB, 1991-2008 65%1 +3.1% 
DE, 1990-2007 78% -2.5% 
ES, 1990-2008 68%² +3.8% 
CH, 1991-2008 73% -1.8% 
1
 1993 ² 1989/90 
 
A finding based on only four cases can only be tentative. We try to get a better grip 
on institutions' influence by disaggregating change in the employment structure 
according to five occupational categories: (i) (associate) managers and administrators; 
(ii) (semi-) professionals; (iii) office clerks; (iv) craft and production workers; (v) 
interpersonal service and sales workers.9 We expect jobs in this last category to be 
particularly sensitive to wage-setting institutions, as prices and hence consumption of 
interpersonal services are – unlike jobs in production and the back office – primarily 
determined by wage costs (rather than by capital costs and technology use, which are 
limited). The results of this disaggregation, shown in figure 5, point towards three 
similarities and one strong contrast in countries’ employment trajectories.  
The first and clearest cross-national resemblance concerns managers and 
professionals’ strong growth in the two top quintiles. Occupational upgrading was 
driven in all four countries by professionals and, above all, managers’ massive 
expansion. A second similarity refers to production workers' strong decline in all four 
countries. In Britain and Germany, production workers’ relative job losses were 
distributed quite equally across quintiles 1 to 4, whereas in Spain and Switzerland they 
were concentrated in the bottom quintile. A third similarity concerns the falling share of 
office clerks in Britain, Germany and Switzerland. This fall hollowed out the 
employment structure, for clerical jobs primarily disappeared from quintile 3. The 
decline in clerical employment was particularly substantial in Britain and Switzerland, 
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where clerks' share in the workforce dropped by 4.1 and 7.7 percentage points 
respectively. Contrary to the other three countries, clerks’ employment share remained 
stable in Spain. This stability in back office jobs may reflect a slower rate of 
computerization and possibly lagged economic development.  
The trajectory of interpersonal service jobs stands in stark contrast to these three 
broad similarities. While their employment share remained unchanged in Germany and 
Switzerland, Britain and Spain witnessed a substantial increase. These cross-country 
differences cannot be explained by different starting levels: in 1990, Germany and 
Spain had, respectively, the lowest and highest proportions of interpersonal service jobs. 
In Spain, these jobs expanded mostly in the lowest-paid quintile 1 and, to a lesser 
degree, in quintiles 2 and 4. In Britain, growth of interpersonal service jobs was almost 
exclusively concentrated in the bottom quintile 1. Consequently, variation in 
interpersonal service jobs goes a long way in explaining Britain’s different pattern of 
occupational change. Relative employment at the bottom of the British labour market 
only expanded because of growth in interpersonal service jobs. If these low-paid service 
jobs had not expanded relative to total employment, Britain would have experienced a 
similar-sized decline in quintile 1 of about three percentage points as Germany and 
Switzerland. 
These results for different occupational groups explain why we see a more or less 
marked tendency towards polarization in the four countries. While the fall in clerical 
employment led to comparatively stronger job growth at the bottom than the middle of 
the occupational structure in Britain, Germany and Switzerland, low-paid job expansion 
was conditional on growth in interpersonal services – a condition only met in Britain 
and, to a lesser extent, Spain.  
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Figure 5: the pattern of net employment change by occupational categories 
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Switzerland, 1991-2008 
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
Quintile 1 2 3 4 Quintile 5
Em
pl
oy
m
en
t c
ha
ng
e 
in
 
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 
po
in
ts
Interpersonal
service workers
Production
workers
Office clerks
(Associate)
professionals
(Associate)
managers
 
 
We now summarize our findings and revisit our initial hypotheses. To begin with, 
both skill-biased technical change (SBTC) and skill supply evolution predict a similar 
pattern of clear-cut occupational upgrading across countries. Hence, they grasp the big 
picture in all four countries, most clearly so in Germany. At the same time, while SBTC 
and skill supply evolution describe the general tendency, they fail to account for the 
strong employment loss in the middling occupations. To explain this trough in the 
middle, we need the refined theory of technological change provided by the 
routinization hypothesis: technology has been more successful in substituting for 
(routine) clerical and production jobs than for (non-routine) interpersonal service 
occupations. While the former – especially clerical jobs – cluster in the middle range of 
the occupational hierarchy in pay, the latter are set at the very bottom. Hence, we 
observe stronger job decline in the middle than the bottom of the employment structure, 
leading to the slightly polarized pattern of upgrading predicted by routinization.  
There is an important caveat to this explanation: the routinization hypothesis has 
been tailored to explaining job changes in the United States (Autor et al., 2003, Autor et 
al., 2008) and Britain (Goos and Manning, 2007) – two countries with among the most 
flexible wage-setting institutions in the OECD. It is an open question to what extent the 
observed job growth at the occupational lower-end can be extrapolated to countries 
where the wage structure is more sheltered. Our results show that employment in the 
lowest paid quintile has only expanded in Britain – and there exclusively among 
interpersonal service jobs –, and in Spain after 1996, but not in Germany or 
Switzerland. Hence, while we observe everywhere a collapse of middling jobs in 
quintiles 2 and 3 (Spain being an exception), growth in quintile 1 only took place in 
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countries where the low-wage sector is relatively unsheltered from market pressure. 
Different country institutions may thus channel technological change into a more or less 
polarized pattern of occupational upgrading.  
 
7. Conclusions 
Our objective has been to analyze the pattern of occupational change in four Western 
European countries and examine which theoretical account is most consistent with: 
skill-biased technical change, routinization, skill supply evolution or wage-setting 
institutions? Our findings reveal two similarities across these countries.  
Firstly, we obtain everywhere a picture of massive occupational upgrading. In all 
four countries, by far the strongest employment growth occurred at the top of the 
occupational hierarchy, among managers and professionals. Over the last two decades, 
educational expansion and occupational upgrading seem to have gone hand in hand. 
While this is most clearly the case in Germany and Switzerland, educational advance 
may have slightly outpaced occupational upgrading in Britain and, above all, Spain. 
Secondly, employment declined more strongly in average-paid jobs (among clerks and 
production workers) than in low-paid jobs (where interpersonal service workers cluster) 
in Switzerland and, especially, Britain. The same polarizing trend becomes also visible 
for Germany after 1996 and for Spain after 2002. 
Hence, we find a general thrust towards occupational upgrading – particularly 
marked in Germany – that is both consistent with the evolution of skills on the supply 
side and a skill-biased version of technological change (SBTC) on the demand side. Yet 
without turning to the routinization hypothesis we cannot explain the hollowing out in 
the middle of the employment structure. Solely based on changes in the supply of skills, 
we would have expected a smaller decline in average-paid jobs and a larger fall in low-
paid jobs. The polarized pattern of occupational upgrading observed for Britain and 
Switzerland (and for Germany after 1996 and Spain after 2002) is consistent with the 
idea that technology is a better substitute for the routine tasks typical of mid-range 
production and office jobs than for the non-routine tasks characteristic of low-paid 
interpersonal service jobs.  
At the same time, we find sizeable cross-country differences in the employment 
evolution at the bottom of the occupational hierarchy that run contrary to accounts of 
uniform technical change. Low-paid interpersonal service jobs have expanded 
significantly in Spain and, above all, Britain, but stagnated in Germany and 
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Switzerland. We have argued that wage-setting institutions filter the pattern of 
occupational change: countries only seem to experience a trend towards polarization if 
wage-setting institutions facilitate the creation of low-paid interpersonal service jobs. 
Our evidence suggests that this may be more the case in Britain and Spain than 
Germany and Switzerland.  
What are the implications of our findings? On the one hand, they prompt optimism: 
the number of ‘lovely’ jobs has clearly grown much faster than that of ‘lousy’ jobs and 
we can unambiguously discard the hypothesis of occupational downgrading after 1990. 
On the other hand, the fall in the middle of the occupational structure may be cause for 
pessimism. Wright and Dwyer’s (2003: 322) concern about low-paid workers’ declining 
opportunities for upward mobility in the American labour market might also apply to 
Western Europe.  
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Annexe 
Table A.1: the number of observations in the subsamples in the different surveys 
  1990 1996 2002 2008 
  
N Work-
force 
N w/ work 
income 
N Work-
force 
N w/ work 
income 
N Work-
force 
N w/ work 
income 
N Work-
force 
N w/ work 
income 
GB LFS 54760¹ 8436² 51200 6891 47551 12346 41402 9946 
DE SOEP 7977 7746 6451 6418 11287 11185 9400³ 9269³ 
ES EPA 58582 92804 57359 - 59379 - 62697 38545 
CH SAKE 8490¹ 6470¹ 7993 6807 20430 17218 23351 19901 
¹ 1991; ² 1993; ³ 2007; 4 1989 and 1990; 5 2006. 
Notes: Our subsample is defined as individuals aged 18-65 who work at least 20 hours per week. In the British 
LFS, information on earnings was only asked to respondents of one out of six waves between 1992 and 1996. 
From 1997 onwards, earnings data is available for two out of six waves.  
 
Table A.2: contribution by nationality-gender groups to the pattern of occupational change  
  Net employment change (in percentage points) 
  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 All quintiles 
Britain National men -1.0 -3.4 -3.2 -2.8 3.2 -7.2 
1991-2008 National women -0.1 -1.8 -2.1 2.3 4.0 2.9 
 Foreign men 1.0 0.4 0.3 0.3 1.0 2.3 
 Foreign women 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.6 1.9 
  Entire labour force 0.6 -4.6 -4.9 0.2 8.7 0 
Germany National men -0.4 -1.9 -1.0 -2.3 2.7 -2.8 
1990-2007 National women -2.4 0.4 -0.5 1.5 4.2 3.3 
 Foreign men -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 -0.2 0.2 -0.8 
 Foreign women 0.3 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.3 
 Entire labour force -2.6 -1.7 -1.9 -1.0 7.2 0 
Spain National men -5.3 -7.3 -3.7 -5.1 3.7 -17.6 
1990-2008 National women -3.7 -1.3 3.3 -0.2 4.4 2.4 
 Foreign men 1.1 2.4 2.7 1.5 1.1 8.9 
 Foreign women 3.0 1.5 0.6 0.7 0.5 6.3 
 Entire labour force 
-4.9 -4.7 2.9 -3.1 9.8 0 
Switzerland National men -0.9 -2.3 -3.9 -1.0 3.3 -4.8 
1991-2008 National women -1.7 -0.4 -1.6 1.7 4.2 2.1 
 Foreign men -0.6 0.1 -0.7 0.4 1.9 1.0 
 Foreign women -0.3 0.6 -0.2 0.5 1.0 1.6 
 Entire labour force -3.5 -2.0 -6.4 1.5 10.4 0 
 
 32 
Endnotes 
                                                 
1
 In the British Labour Force Survey (LFS), occupations are coded according to SOC90 between 1991 
and 2000, and according to SOC2000 after 2001. We have transformed SOC2000 codes into SOC90 
codes on the basis of three dual-coded (SOC90 and SOC2000) British surveys: the Census 1991, LFS 
1996/97 and LFS 2000. In Spain, occupations were coded with the 3-digit 1974 version of the CNO in 
1990 and with the 1994 version thereafter. To make the two classifications comparable, we established 
our own correspondence between the 1979 and the 1994 codes based on the frequency distributions 
observed in the dual-coded survey 2634 (CNO 1979 and CNO 1994), performed by the Spanish Centre 
for Sociological Research in 2006.  
2
 For instance, in the German SOEP, small occupations such as ‘Sanitarians’ (ISCO-code 3222) and 
‘Dieticians, Nutritionists’ (3223) are recoded as ‘Modern Health Associate Professionals except Nursing 
Associate Professionals’ (3229). 
3
 In the Swiss database, we distinguish senior officials and managers, secretaries, other office clerks and 
other elementary occupations on the basis on the industry in which they are employed. Likewise, for 
Spanish data, we differentiate unspecified business owners, mid- and low-rank office clerks, operators of 
mobile machinery, truck drivers and cleaners according to their sector of employment.  
4
 In the German SOEP and Swiss SAKE, this means dividing information about individuals’ monthly 
earnings through their usual working hours. While the British LFS has direct information on jobholders’ 
hourly wages (employees only), wage information is only available starting from winter 1992/1993 (and 
only for a part of respondents: first one, then two out of six waves). Accordingly, for Britain, occupations’ 
median earnings are calculated over the period 1993-2008. 
For the smallest sample in our study, the SOEP, we make sure that an occupation’s median earning is 
reliable by also using intermediate years to calculate occupations’ median earnings: the year at the 
beginning (1990), then every third year in the middle (1993, 1996, and so on) up to the year at the end of 
the time period (2007). 
The Spanish EPA does not include data on earnings. Consequently, we calculate occupations’ median 
earnings by relying on three other surveys, performed in 1989, 1990 and 2006. The 1989 and 2006 
surveys were carried out by Spain’s Centre for Sociological Research. They contain detailed occupational 
and earnings information on about 6700 and 3600 individuals, respectively. The 1990 survey was part of 
Erik Wright’s international comparative class project and has 2900 valid cases. It was combined with the 
1989 survey to provide single estimates of occupational earnings for the beginning of the period analyzed. 
5
 Since occupations come in lumpy units, rank-ordered occupations are aggregated into groups containing 
as close as possible to 20% of employment, but not exactly 20% (but rather 19.2% or 20.7%). However, 
all results shown below are corrected for these deviations.  
6
 The coding scheme is available from the authors.  
7
 The following six educational levels are distinguished: obligatory education, post-obligatory education 
but no upper secondary education, lower upper secondary education, higher upper secondary education, 
lower tertiary education, higher tertiary education. The recoding of these educational levels is available 
from the authors. 
8
 The following four age groups are distinguished: 18-30, 31-40, 41-50, 51-65 years. 
9
 We allocate individuals to these occupational categories on the basis of 4-digit ISCO-codes for Germany 
and Switzerland, 3-digit SOC-codes for Britain and CNO-codes for Spain. For the logic and coding of 
these occupational groups, see Authors (2006). 
